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Missed Opportunities: The Restructuring of Berlin’s Airport System 
and the City’s Position in International Airline Networks 
 
Abstract 
After its history as a divided city, Berlin was expected to become a major world city 
following reunification.  While the city has grown in terms of investment and social 
capital, it has not attained the preeminent status on the global stage that was expected.  
One important reason for this is that Berlin remains no more than a secondary hub in the 
global airline industry. In this article, we measure the city’s importance in airline 
networks at four points from 1989 to 2006. We then explain the city’s stature in those 
networks today as a product of both larger forces in the airline industry and 
circumstances more specific to Berlin. The former include liberalization and the 
development of airline alliances. In Berlin, meanwhile, the fractured airport system, 
which the city inherited from the Cold War, has been an obstacle to Berlin’s aspirations 
for centrality in the airline industry. We trace the history of airports in Berlin, including 
the long planning process for Berlin Brandenburg International Airport, which will 
eventually replace the three separate airports still in use. Although Berlin’s history is 
unique, we argue that it is the larger economic and political forces affecting all airports 
that have fostered the city’s continued marginalization within the world’s air 
transportation system. 
 




JEL Classifications: O18, R40 
 
Introduction 
In April 1990, about midway between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the formal 
reunification of Germany, the German newspaper Die Zeit predicted that Berlin would 
become a “magnet-city and a political-economical-cultural supernova” (quoted in 
KULKE, 2003:219). A decade and a half later, it is fair to say that that rosy scenario has 
failed to come to fruition. Although Berlin was made the German capital again in 1991 
and some parts of the economy have been revitalized, the city has not regained the 
economic and cultural primacy it enjoyed before World War II. Indeed, Berlin has 
suffered from high unemployment rates, even by German standards (KULKE, 2003). 
More broadly, Berlin has not attained the world city status that once seemed its certain 
destiny (GORNIG and HÄUSSERMANN, 2002).  
A significant reason for the yawning gap between expectation and reality has been 
the absence of a well-connected international airport. In the 1930s, Berlin’s Tempelhof 
was Europe’s greatest airport (HUGILL, 1993; PEARMAN, 2004); but the division of 
Europe, Germany, and Berlin during the Cold War relegated the fractured city to a 
marginal position in the networks of the rapidly developing postwar airline industry. 
Although German reunification has improved its air services, Berlin remains poorly 
connected compared to other European cities of its size. To remedy that situation, a major 
element in the development strategy for Berlin and the surrounding Brandenburg state 
has been to replace three existing airports with a single, much larger Berlin-Brandenburg 
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International Airport (BBI). In this article, we examine the evolution of air services in 
Berlin and the controversies surrounding BBI. We argue that the controversy and delays 
in the planning for the new airport made the city a passive participant in the spatial 
reconfiguration of Europe’s airline industry, which has been transformed by jarring 
changes of its own during the same decade and a half. The net result is that, while the 
sheer volume of airline capacity in Berlin has surged, the city’s stature within the global 
airline network has languished.    
The story of Berlin and its airports is unique. Certainly, no other city has 
experienced such extraordinary political changes in the past sixty years.  However, 
despite this unique context, many elements of the airport expansion debate in Berlin and 
the larger airline industry forces affecting the city are quite similar to those found 
elsewhere (CIDELL, forthcoming). First, like other new airports, BBI has been inspired 
by its potential significance as an engine of economic growth. The belief in the 
transformative power of major airports is long-standing, and recent globalization has only 
served to augment the economic salience of airports. Recognizing the significance of air 
transport networks as a manifestation of power in the global economy, many scholars 
have used centrality in those networks as a measure of the rank of places in the world-city 
hierarchy (SMITH and TIMBERLAKE, 1995; SMITH and TIMBERLAKE, 1998; SHIN 
and TIMBERLAKE, 2000; BOWEN, 2002; MATSUMOTO, 2004; DERUDDER and 
WHITLOX, 2005; ZOOK and BRUNN, 2006). There is also a substantial literature 
documenting more specific links between centrality in airline networks and economic 
development (IRWIN and KASARDA, 1991; IVY, FIK, and MALECKI, 1995; 
DEBBAGE, 1999; BUTTON and TAYLOR, 2000; DEBBAGE and DELK, 2001). For 
 5
example, airline hubs and international air gateways are more likely to attract headquarter 
functions, “high-tech” jobs, and foreign investment.  
Those places consigned to the margins of airline networks, on the other hand, 
suffer markedly poorer accessibility, in terms both of travel time and travel costs (ZOOK 
and BRUNN, 2006). Furthermore, for “spoke” cities and regions, increased demand for 
air traffic often ends up benefiting other places. For example, if passengers coming from 
an area such as the Baltic region do not have direct overseas connections, but must 
transfer through airports such as London or Frankfurt, "the connections to the rest of the 
world would be channeled through external hubs.  That would mean that the strong 
magnetism such centers have on businesses would lead to growth and development 
outside the region, but based on the dynamism of the region" (MATHIESSEN 2004, 
202).  
Second, airports are potent symbols, not just economic engines. A city’s airport is 
the place where first and last impressions are made. The world’s most talented architects, 
members of the so-called global intelligence corps (OLDS, 1995), compete for the 
biggest airport terminals, which are second only to major museums in their prestige. No 
wonder the newest airport terminals offer cathedral-like grandeur within and distinctive 
rooflines without, from the gigantic outstretched wings of the avian Pudong in Shanghai 
to the sea of peaked white meringue atop Denver International. These airports have 
become signatures for the cities they serve.  
Third, new airports – like airports of old – are lightning rods for controversy. Major 
airports impose a heavy burden upon their neighbors: noise, air and water pollution, road 
congestion, and the loss of vast swaths of land to other uses. Particularly in Europe, there 
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is also a growing awareness of the farther-reaching implications of airport development, 
including the massive financial cost of new airports and aviation’s rapidly escalating role 
in contributing to greenhouse gas emissions. As we describe below, noise and 
environmental concerns have figured prominently in citizen opposition to the BBI.  
Finally, the remarkable political changes in Germany and Berlin took place at about 
the same time that the European airline industry went through a watershed of its own. 
Airline industry liberalization has been one front in a broader shift away from state-
owned industries and towards deregulation throughout Europe (BRENNER 1999, 2004; 
BRENNER and THEODORE 2002, GRAHAM 1997, SWYNGEDOUW 1997, 
SWYNGEDOUW et al. 2002).  Specifically, three packages of reforms implemented in 
1988, 1990, and 1993 were designed to gradually remove restrictions on intra-European 
flights, privatize airlines and airports, and move towards a more integrated Europe. 
Collectively, these changes have fostered a more competitive and dynamic airline 
industry. The resulting shifts in the geography of air transport in Europe offer new 
opportunities but also formidable challenges for aspiring hubs like Berlin.  
It was in this context that the story of BBI unfolded. Before turning to the more 
recent chapters in that story, we first track the historical development of aviation in 
Germany and the airport system in Berlin before 1990. We then analyze how Berlin’s 
position in European airline networks has changed since German reunification. That 
analysis sets the stage for an examination of the BBI project. Finally, we offer an 
assessment of the likely future development of aviation in Berlin and the broader 
implications of this case.  
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The Development of German Aviation and Berlin’s Airports to 1990 
The first Berlin airport was opened in Tempelhof in 1923 (Figure 1). Tempelhof has 
been described as “perhaps the single most important airport in the history of aviation” 
(PEARMAN, 2004: 53). Orville Wright made demonstration flights there when it was 
still just a parade ground in 1909. Between World War I and World War II, it was the 
major hub of Europe and the world’s largest airline, Deutsche Luft Hansa (DLH). With 
German power on the ascent both politically and economically in the 1930s, the Nazi 
Government rebuilt the airport on a massive scale. Only after World War II was 
Tempelhof overshadowed by two newer airports, one for each of the two sides of the only 
city split in two by the Cold War. In order to understand the development of Berlin’s 
airport system it is necessary to describe its history in the context of the development of 
aviation in Germany more generally. 
 
The Interwar Years: Berlin as Europe’s Preeminent Hub 
Ironically, although World War II ended Berlin’s rank at the forefront of European 
aviation, Germany’s loss in World War I a generation earlier indirectly augmented the 
city’s stature in the nascent airline industry (DAVIES, 1964). Among the terms of the 
1919 Versailles Treaty was a clause limiting the kinds of airplanes Germany could 
manufacture. So while Britain and France invested in both military and civil aviation in 
the 1920s, Germany’s efforts were confined to the latter. The emphasis on civil aviation 
was well-timed because the decade after World War I brought the first real flowering of 
the passenger airline industry. A decade after Orville Wright’s demonstration flight at 
Tempelhof, the earliest sustained passenger airline service in the world was launched by 
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Deutsche Luft Reederei (DLR) on February 22, 1919 between Tempelhof and the 
country’s temporary capital at Weimar (DAVIES, 1964). 
Defeat alone, however, cannot explain the singular importance of Germany and 
Berlin in early European aviation. German “air-mindedness” (DAVIES, 1964: 23) also 
mattered. As a largely landlocked power with a still incomplete land transport network, 
aviation had particular appeal to Germany. Reflecting their faith in the future significance 
of air travel, local patriotism, and inter-urban rivalry, city and state governments joined 
the central government in subsidizing air routes across the country and beyond after 
World War I (HUGILL, 1993).  
Through the 1920s, Germany ranked first in the world with respect to travel by air; 
and DLH, formed in 1926 through the amalgamation of DLR and other startups, was the 
largest airline in the world (DAVIES, 1964). By 1931, when Britain’s flag carrier 
Imperial Airways had only 22 aircraft, DLH had 145 and linked forty-nine other 
European cities to its Tempelhof hub. Beyond Europe, DLH flights reached as far west as 
Santiago, Chile, and as far east as Bangkok, Thailand. By 1939, DLH flew to twenty-five 
destinations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, nearly as many as Air France and 
Imperial Airways (DAVIES, 1964). The two latter carriers integrated overseas empires, 
but DLH catered primarily to German business interests. The airline was also an 
important political symbol of Germany’s power. As the Nazi government’s flag carrier, 
DLH literally carried the swastika everywhere it flew, and its pervasive presence across 
Europe foreshadowed the German military expansion to come.  
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The Development of Berlin’s Airports during the Cold War  
The outbreak of war severed many of Berlin’s links to the rest of the world. The 
same was true, of course, for the other great European capitals; but when the dust settled 
in 1945, the situation of Berlin in the airline industry was transformed far more radically 
than that of London, Paris, Rome, or Moscow. After the German capitulation, the Allied 
Forces occupied Berlin and jointly administered the city. Almost immediately rifts started 
to develop between the Western Allies (France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.) and 
the Soviet Union over how Germany and Berlin should be controlled and what reforms 
should be carried out. When the Western Allies decided to cooperate closely in their 
respective zones of occupation and implemented a currency reform, the Soviets 
responded by blocking all land access routes to the western sectors of Berlin in 1948. The 
only way to supply West Berlin was through the air, prompting the famed Berlin Airlift. 
Since the runway capacity at Tempelhof in the American sector and Gatow, a small 
military airport in the British sector, was too small to handle all the supply planes, Tegel 
airport was hastily built on a former shooting range in the French sector of the city 
(HUSCHKE, 1999).  
 In 1950, the Allies returned the operation of the airports in their respective sectors 
to the Germans; however, the former remained responsible for organizing air traffic from 
and to Berlin. The Western Allies decided that each of the Allies would use only one 
airline to serve Berlin (Air France, British European Airways (BEA), and Pan Am). 
Deutsche Luft Hansa, using simply Lufthansa as its brand name after the war (Davies, 
1964), was resurrected in 1954; but neither Lufthansa nor any other German airline was 
allowed to fly to or from West Berlin (MECHAM, 1990b). By contrast, the East German 
 10
Lufthansa, later transformed into Interflug, continued to serve Schönefeld Airport on the 
outskirts of East Berlin (VON PRZYCHOWSKI, 1996).  
During the Cold War, airline service in the two Berlins developed along separate 
tracks. Ironically, although West Berlin was heavily dependent upon air services to 
maintain its links to the rest of West Germany and Western Europe, the city lost, perhaps 
irretrievably, the airline network centrality it had once enjoyed. The imposition of the 
Berlin Wall severed West Berlin from its natural hinterland, which would otherwise have 
generated traffic for air services from the city and adjacent region. In West Berlin itself, 
important sectors of the economy atrophied, undermining business traffic. Before World 
War II, Berlin had been Germany’s foremost center of manufacturing and business 
(KULKE, 2003). Berlin was the “Elektropolis”, a world-class center of electrical 
engineering and home to the headquarters of industrial giants like Siemens and AEG. The 
country’s leading financial institutions and culture industries were also centered in Berlin. 
And of course Berlin was the capital of a large country and an expanding imperial state. 
After World War II and the division of the country and city, the capital was moved to 
Bonn, advanced manufacturing shifted to Munich and Stuttgart, and Frankfurt emerged 
as the chief German financial center. The functions that remained in Berlin included local 
public administration, university education, tourism, and heavily subsidized 
manufacturing (e.g. the German cigarette industry). These generated air traffic, of course, 
but on a more modest scale than would have been true if Berlin had retained its broad 
economic primacy.  
Throughout the Cold War, the dominant airlines in West Berlin were Pan Am and 
British Airways (BA), the successor of BEA. Together, the two airlines accounted for the 
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vast majority of commercial flights between West Berlin and the rest of West Germany. 
In the highly politicized airline industry of the post-World War II era, it was very unusual 
for a carrier to have the right of cabotage (permission to carry traffic between two 
domestic points in a foreign country).  However, a handful of Allied carriers not only had 
the right of cabotage for decades in West Germany, but also faced no German 
competition. Moreover, there was little competition between Pan Am and BA. The two 
foreign carriers agreed to a route swap so that each enjoyed a monopoly on most of the 
routes it flew from the city beginning in 1975.  
With little fear of competition and with the further bonus of subsidies from the 
German government, the foreign carriers found Berlin a profitable destination (Aviation 
Week & Space Technology, 1988), but services to the city were more weakly developed 
than would have been expected based on the size and wealth of the city. In 1988, for 
instance, the number of passengers handled by West Berlin’s two airports (Tegel and 
Tempelhof) was just 5.6 million on all flights and 1.2 million on international flights. By 
comparison, Frankfurt, which Lufthansa had made its hub after World War II, handled 
eight times as much total traffic and fifteen times as much international traffic. 
Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart also handled much higher volumes of traffic 
than West Berlin (ICAO, 1990).   
Meanwhile, East Berlin’s air linkages were also warped, though less severely, by 
the Cold War. Although Interflug’s network from its Schönefeld hub eventually extended 
to Asia and Africa, East Berlin’s external links were, like other East European capitals’, 
primarily to fellow Warsaw Pact countries.  In the aggregate, then, Berlin had good air 
links to both sides of the Iron Curtain; but there was no integration of those links to make 
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the city the continental and intercontinental hub it had been in the interwar years. Of the 
57 cities with nonstop scheduled airline service to Berlin in early 1989, only three 
(Amsterdam, Copenhagen, and Stockholm) were connected to more than one of Berlin’s 
airports (Figure 2). Indeed, both Tegel’s and Schönefeld’s connections to other cities 
were characterized by an extraordinary degree of direction bias, the former having no 
links to the east and latter almost none to the west. A further distinction was that 




The Restructuring of Berlin’s Airport System after Reunification 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990, the 
united Berlin found itself with one of the most unusual airport systems in the world. 
Berlin had three airports with a total of six runways administered by different 
organizations that were now in competition with one another (BÜRGERBEWEGUNG-
FLUGHAFENSYSTEM, 2006; BVBB, 2003). Berlin immediately began to call for a 
new large international airport to support its new role as the German capital and to serve 
as a gateway to Eastern Europe. As the development of the international air network is 
intertwined with the planning for the new Berlin Brandenburg International Airport 
(BBI), we first examine the evolution of Berlin’s position in the networks of the 
international airline industry. 
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The Place of Berlin’s Air Services in Reunified Germany and the New Europe 
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, and the broader collapse 
of the Iron Curtain had major ramifications for the city’s air service. Perhaps most 
importantly, Lufthansa returned to the city. In October 1990, the German flag carrier 
commenced operations with seventy-four daily flights from Berlin to European 
destinations as well as service to important distant gateways such as New York and 
Tokyo (MECHAM, 1990a). Lufthansa’s rapid recovery of its long ago dominance in 
Berlin was facilitated by the collapse of Interflug, which ceased flying in 1991 (VON 
PRZYCHOWSKI, 2001).  
The expansion of Lufthansa services was partially offset by the diminished role 
played by Pan Am and BA. Their last cabotage services from Berlin were flown in 1992 
(VON PRZYCHOWSKI, 2001). Nevertheless, the incorporation of Berlin into the 
networks of foreign carriers accelerated sharply in the early 1990s. Singapore Airlines, El 
Al, Egyptair, Japan Airlines, and Air Lanka all commenced scheduled services to 
Schönefeld by 1992; and Alitalia, American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Iberia, KLM, 
Olympic, TAP, and Turkish Airlines launched flights to Tegel (VON PRZYCHOWSKI, 
2001). The jump in services manifested the confidence in the future importance of Berlin 
as a well-positioned hub in a Europe now free of its Cold War divisions. Still, the patterns 
of the past were not easily shed. Western European airlines tended to use the city airports 
in West Berlin, and airlines from Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Asia primarily used 
Schönefeld, making it difficult for Berlin to evolve into an intercontinental hub. Overall, 
because Western European airlines led the way into reunified Berlin, Tegel and 
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especially Tempelhof rapidly increased their share of overall Berlin air traffic; 
conversely, between 1989 and 1992, Schönefeld’s share, in terms of scheduled seats per 
week, fell from twenty-five percent to nine percent (Figure 3).  
Overall, the expansion of services both to the east and especially to the west did 
increase the connectivity of Berlin in Europe’s airline networks (IVY, 1995). One way 
that a city’s connectivity in a transportation network can be measured is by summing the 
number of links (e.g. nonstop flights in this analysis) necessary to connect a node (e.g. a 
city) to every other node in the network. IVY (1995) applied such a methodology to data 
drawn from the Official Airline Guide, a monthly publication containing schedules for 
virtually every airline in the world. His analysis found that Berlin’s connectivity 
improved markedly between 1989 and 1993. In terms of first-order (i.e. nonstop) 
connections to a sample of 36 European cities, Berlin’s three airports together ranked 
thirteenth in 1989. Moscow (first), Frankfurt (second), and Paris and London (tied for 
third) led the list. Berlin ranked lower than both Prague and Warsaw, despite those cities’ 
smaller populations. By 1993, Berlin’s rank had improved to ninth, pulling ahead of its 
two Eastern European rivals, while Frankfurt displaced Moscow to take first place in 
first-order connections within Europe. Similarly, when first-order and higher-order 
connections (that is, connections requiring at least one stop) are considered together (but 
with first-order connections weighted more heavily) to produce a measure of total 
connectivity, Berlin again showed a sharp increase in its stature within European airline 
networks between 1989 and 1993.  
Yet the early 1990s marked something of a high-water mark for Berlin’s aspirations 
to centrality in international airline networks. In 1994, Lufthansa announced that it would 
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make Munich its second hub rather than Berlin because of the difficulties associated with 
air services fractured among three airports (VON PRZYCHOWSKI, 2001). Additionally, 
Air Lanka, Air Canada, American Airlines, Japan Airlines, and Singapore Airlines all 
abandoned the city by the end of the 1990s because traffic from the German capital fell 
short of expectations.  
We repeated Ivy’s analysis for the year 2003, again using data from the Official 
Airline Guide. In terms of first-order connections, there were significant changes in the 
ranking of European cities (Table 1). Vienna ascended to first place with respect to both 
first-order connections and total connectivity. Other cities whose rank among the sample 
of 36 improved sharply included Stockholm, Dublin, Prague, and Rome. Conversely, 
only Sofia suffered a worse setback than Berlin. The German capital’s rank in first-order 
connections fell from ninth in 1993 to fifteenth in 2003 (tied with Brussels, whose 
connectivity eroded following the collapse of the Belgian flag carrier Sabena in 2001).  
Similarly, in terms of total connectivity, Berlin’s rank fell from ninth in 1993 to sixteenth 
in 2003.  
It should be noted that the methodology employed here and in Ivy’s analysis does 
not take account of the density of linkages. If the number of flights or seats is 
incorporated in the analysis, the degree to which Berlin is overshadowed by major 
European hubs is even more striking (Figure 4). In particular, hubs like London, Paris, 
and Frankfurt are served at higher frequency by much larger aircraft on average. In its 
metropolitan population, Berlin ranks ninth in Europe but in terms of total seats on 
scheduled air services it ranked twentieth in 2003, having less capacity than even Dublin 
and Helsinki despite the latter two cities’ much smaller populations.  
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Furthermore, because Berlin’s air services remain fractured among three airports, 
its ranking in the preceding analyses is somewhat misleading. For instance, Berlin is ill-
suited to serve as a hub for a traveler between Milan and Minsk because flights from the 
former arrive at Tegel but those to the latter depart from Schönefeld. More generally, of 
the twenty-five other cities in Ivy’s sample to which Berlin had nonstop links in 2003, 
twenty-one were served from Tegel, six from Schönefeld, and four from Tempelhof; 
London was the only city served from all three Berlin airports. Nevertheless, by 2003, the 
former east-west partition of services between Tegel and Schönefeld had eroded 
significantly (Figure 5).  
The subordinate position of the city in Europe’s airline networks is particularly 
clear when intercontinental routes are considered. Berlin’s nonstop services in 2003 
beyond Europe were few and directed primarily at tourist destinations such as Varadero 
in Cuba and Hurgada in Egypt (Figure 5). In fact, holiday destinations, particularly along 
the Mediterranean, comprised most of the new points to which Berlin gained nonstop 
services between 1992 and 2003. Conspicuously absent were links to distant financial 
centers such as Tokyo that one would have expected given Berlin’s stature as the capital 
of the world’s third largest economy. Japan Airlines pulled out of the market after just 
two years in 1992, severing Berlin’s nonstop service to Tokyo. Delta Air Lines’ 
withdrawal in 1998 ended nonstop service to New York for seven years (VON 
PRZYCHOWSKI, 2001; CONNELLY, 2005).  
Yet even as some flag carriers – including Germany’s own Lufthansa (see below) -- 
lost their enthusiasm for Berlin, a new kind of airline was emerging in Europe that would 
have dramatic consequences for the city and for the region. Since the early 1990s, dozens 
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of low-cost carriers (LCCs) have flourished in Europe’s liberalized airline industry. LCCs 
such as EasyJet and Ryanair have changed travel patterns throughout Europe, opening up 
new destinations to tourism and generally increasing the number of flights and passengers 
(PANTAZIS and LIEFNER, 2005; BIEGER and WITTMER, 2006; 
PAPATHEODOROU and LEI, 2006). One of the main reasons LCCs are able to offer 
flights at very low costs is their use of secondary airports serving major hubs (e.g., 
Frankfurt-Hahn, a ninety-minute bus ride from the city) and airports underserved by the 
major flag carriers, including those in Berlin. LCCs have therefore changed not only the 
geography of air travel from the passenger point of view, but in terms of the spatial 
distribution of airports as well.  
The structure of the airline industry in Berlin has been strongly affected by the rise 
of the LCCs (Table 2). In early 1989, all but one of the ten most important airlines 
serving the city were flag carriers (the solitary exception was a subsidiary of Air France). 
A few years later in 1992 Lufthansa dominated the Berlin market, providing 60 percent 
of seats through the German capital. Yet by 2003, Lufthansa had shifted course. It 
remained the top carrier in the market; but, as we discuss below, Lufthansa no longer 
viewed Berlin as a potential hub. Conversely, Air Berlin, a rapidly growing LCC, did, 
and by 2003, it was the city’s third largest carrier.  
Like many other European LCCs, Air Berlin evolved from a charter operator and 
therefore its present network of scheduled services reflects an emphasis on tourist traffic 
with many flights to Mediterranean destinations. Indeed, partly because the airline has 
such a big presence in the Mediterranean, it established a hub at Palma de Mallorca 
(BAKER, 2006). The leisure emphasis of this and other European LCCs is important 
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because they tend not to carry the kind of traffic that defines world cities. Furthermore, 
LCCs are unlikely to restore Berlin’s prominence inasmuch as other cities in Europe and 
in Germany more specifically (especially Cologne) have attracted LCC operations, too. 
Nevertheless, LCCs are expected to be an important part of the future mix of airlines at 
Berlin, and a dedicated low-cost terminal is part of the redesign for BBI (PILLING, 
2004).  
Although the LCCs have gained a significant share of traffic within Europe, they 
play only a minor role in traffic to and from other regions. Instead, the flag carriers of the 
past generally remain dominant at that scale. To perpetuate their advantage and to 
circumvent the continued regulatory barriers to their globalization, major carriers have 
formed world-encircling alliances. The three most important are the Star Alliance, 
oneworld, and Skyteam. Alliances mesh the schedules, frequent flyer programs, and 
information technology systems of member airlines in order to create nearly seamless air 
transportation partnerships whose scale and scope would be impossible for any one 
airline to operate (BURGHOUWT and HAKFOORT, 2001). Geographically, alliance 
traffic is funneled into a relative handful of intercontinental hubs. Both Frankfurt and 
Munich have the advantage of being well-served by members of the Star Alliance, the 
largest alliance. Of the Star Alliance’s sixteen members, including Lufthansa, fourteen fly 
to Frankfurt and eleven to Munich. Indeed, the new Terminal 2 at Munich’s Franz Josef 
Strauss Airport was designed to cater to the Star Alliance (BAKER, 2000). Conversely, 
of the sixteen Star Alliance members, only the four with nearby hubs – Lufthansa, LOT 
Polish, Austrian, and Scandinavian – fly to any airport in Berlin. Similarly, Berlin is 
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weakly served by the airlines that make up the oneworld, though most of the carriers in 
Skyteam do serve Berlin. 
The nearly simultaneous emergence of LCCs and global alliances as important new 
features of the airline industry has had mixed implications for Berlin. On the one hand, 
the LCCs are responsible for a substantial surge in the volume of traffic through Berlin, 
particularly in the past decade. Yet, the LCCs have done little to give Berlin any kind of 
advantage that might propel it back towards the top tier of world cities. Moreover, the 
increased power of the alliances is an important factor ensuring that relatively few cities 
are dominant at the global scale; and Berlin is not one of them. One reason these changes 
in the structure of the airline industry are crucial is because they have reduced the power 
of governments to control the geography of the airline industry. Gone are the days of 
state-owned flag carriers flying with little competition along tightly regulated routes at 
tightly regulated fares. Still, government does affect the geography of industry, 
particularly through the provision of airport infrastructure. Berlin pinned great hopes on 
the power of a new airport to alter that geography in its favor. The replacement of its 
fractured airport system with a single, larger airport was expected to not only keep pace 
with potential increases in air traffic but also be instrumental in the capital’s development 
and enhance Berlin’s international prestige.  
 
A New Old Airport for Berlin 
We now turn to the controversies surrounding the restructuring of Berlin’s airport 
system.  Our analysis is based on a newspaper analysis of over 200 articles published 
between 2000 and 2006 in the Berliner Zeitung, Berliner Kurier and Die Welt (Berlin 
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Edition), all widely circulated newspapers in Berlin, as well as the Chronique 
Scandaleuse, an archive compiled by the citizens’ initiative BVBB, which was at the 
forefront of the opposition to building BBI. 
Shortly after reunification, the three main political actors—the city of Berlin, the 
surrounding state of Brandenburg, and the Federal Government—created the Berlin-
Brandenburg Airport Holding. This placed Berlin’s three airports under a joint 
administration for the first time. Even more importantly, the holding was created to 
coordinate and facilitate the planning of BBI.  Berlin and Brandenburg each have a 37 
percent share in the holding, and the Federal Government has 26 percent (VON 
PRZYCHOWSKI, 2001).  
From the beginning, the three holders did not agree on the future of the Berlin 
airports. Berlin and Brandenburg promoted the construction of a new international 
airport, BBI, while the Federal Government expressed preference for continuing to 
operate a network of several airports. This disagreement would permeate the discussions 
for years to come. In 1992 a study commissioned by Berlin and Brandenburg concluded 
that Sperenberg, a former military airport south of Berlin, would be an excellent location 
for a new international airport. However, a number of other sites were proposed as well: 
Michelsdorf, Jüterbog, Borkheide and Parchim, all in Brandenburg (Figure 1). An 
additional idea was to expand Schönefeld into the new airport. The search committee’s 
criteria were that the new airport had to be reached in 45 minutes from Berlin and could 
not be more than 60 kilometers away from Lehrter Bahnhof, the planned new main train 
station in central Berlin. 
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 As soon as the location-finding stage in the process began, major differences 
became apparent in the interests of the main actors. The state of Brandenburg favored a 
location within its borders, south of Berlin. Brandenburg is an economically weak region, 
so the state government hoped that the airport would provide an important economic 
stimulus. Brandenburg considered Schönefeld unsuitable because this location would not 
be conducive to the intended ‘dispersed concentration’ (the region’s main planning goal 
that redirects development from Berlin to several core regions) and would have a major 
impact on the dense population in the area. The state government therefore favored 
Sperenberg (BÜRGERBEWEGUNG-STANDORTSUCHVERFAHREN, 2006). For its 
part, Berlin also had an interest in having the airport on its territory or in very close 
proximity to reap the economic benefits. The political parties in Berlin, however, did not 
agree either, with the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU) favoring expanding 
Schönefeld, and its rival party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), supporting 
Sperenberg.  
Ignoring the earlier study, which had declared Schönefeld an unsuitable location for 
BBI, the Airport Holding declared that Sperenberg, Jüterbog, and Schönefeld would be 
considered in the Raumordnungsverfahren, a planning procedure aimed at evaluating the 
proposed locations (BÜRGERBEWEGUNG-RAUMORDNUNGSVERFAHREN, 2006). 
Sperenberg was home to a military airport, so many necessary facilities already existed. 
Much of the land was already owned by the government, and otherwise land costs were 
low. Because of its previous military usage, the surrounding area was only thinly settled, 
making 24-hour flight traffic possible. Additionally, it would be easy to connect the 
airport to other transportation lines—it was already connected to the railroad, and the 
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highway linking Berlin to Leipzig and Dresden could be easily extended to the airport 
(BVBB, 1999). Jüterbog had a slightly less attractive profile. It, too, had the advantage of 
low population density and property costs. However, the site was farther away from 
Berlin. Schönefeld was closest to Berlin and easiest to connect to transportation 
infrastructure, but the noise would impact a large number of people so that 24-hour air 
traffic would be undesirable. Based on a list of fifteen criteria the 1994 study concluded 
that Sperenberg and Jüterbog were suitable sites, while Schönefeld was not appropriate to 
house BBI. Even though this was a clear statement against Schönefeld, the Airport 
Holding declared that the result of the Raumordnungsverfahren was not binding and that 
they would continue to consider Schönefeld as an option (VON PRZYCHOWSKI, 2001).  
In addition to the location question, a second controversy developed over how to 
finance BBI. A 1995 report concluded that the additional infrastructure needed for 
Sperenberg would cost 1.3 billion DM (0.9 billion US dollars at the time), while 
Schönefeld would only require 700 million DM (490 million US dollars at the time). 
Berlin and Brandenburg agreed to investigate whether the latter could cover the extra 
expenses; but Brandenburg’s Premier Stolpe soon after admitted that Brandenburg could 
not contribute enough money. At the same time he declared that he would favor a 
multiple-step solution—expanding Schönefeld for now, but later building a new airport in 
Sperenberg. This delay might make it possible to come up with the necessary funds. This 
left the financial question unanswered and added fuel to the location debate. At this time, 
too, the CDU–led Federal Government declared that it was not willing to pay for the 
extra expenses associated with Sperenberg. A bit later, the Federal Government 
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threatened to leave the Airport Holding if the dispute between Berlin and Brandenburg 
about the location continued.  
A third heated debate developed in Berlin over the future of the existing Berlin 
airports, especially Tempelhof. The CDU wanted to keep Tempelhof open as a city 
airport, while the SPD wanted to close it as soon as possible. A citizens’ initiative 
supported the CDU’s stance, as did Lufthansa, who argued that Tempelhof had to remain 
open as a safety valve for Tegel. By 1994, even the members of the Airport Holding did 
not agree about the future of Tempelhof.  
   
Berlin Brandenburg International in Schönefeld 
The year 1996 promised to be a break-through year as politicians finally agreed on 
a location for BBI. Federal Minister of Transportation Wissmann, Berlin’s CDU Mayor 
Diepgen and Brandenburg’s Premier Stolpe (SPD) reached a ‘consensus decision’ to 
build the new international airport in Schönefeld with private investments. Tempelhof 
would be closed as soon as possible, and Tegel would cease operating as soon as BBI 
opened (BVBB, 1999). After these plans were made public, the airlines serving 
Tempelhof immediately stated that they would not move from Tempelhof to Schönefeld. 
A move to Tegel, however, was impossible because the airport could not handle any 
more passengers. Consequently the CDU promoted the expansion of Tegel, which was 
opposed by the SPD, creating another deadlock in the process.  
Now that there was consensus that BBI would be built in Schönefeld, the draft plan 
was presented to the public for comment (Planfeststellungsverfahren). In total, citizens 
filed more than 132,000 complaints against the expansion of Schönefeld into BBI (VON 
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PRZYCHOWSKI, 2001), focusing on noise pollution, the expected decline in property 
values, and the impact on the ground transportation infrastructure. According to German 
planning law, hearings have to be organized to listen and respond to all the complaints 
brought forward by citizens. The sheer volume (approximately 4,000 separate arguments) 
meant that the beginning of construction of the airport (scheduled for 2003) was delayed.  
At the same time as the hearings were taking place, a new federal government 
initiative reduced permissible noise levels around airports. These stricter regulations 
meant that BBI could not be operated late at night, and that a significant amount of 
money had to be budgeted to provide citizens with mandatory noise insulation. Since the 
noise evaluation in the Planfeststellungsverfahren had been done based on the previous 
regulations, it was questionable whether it was still valid.  
The debate concerning the financing of BBI also went into another round. 
According to the ‘consensus decision’, private investors should pay for the airport. After 
several potential investors dropped out early in the process, two serious contenders 
remained—Hochtief (an international construction services provider with experience in 
numerous large infrastructure projects) and IVG (one of the largest real estate companies 
in Europe). In 2000, Hochtief was excluded from consideration because of charges that it 
had obtained an unfair advantage in the competitive bid (RICHTER, 2001). However, 
just months later the Oberlandesgericht (regional court) in Brandenburg overruled the 
decision and said that Hochtief should be allowed to bid. Rather than restarting the entire 
privatization procedure again with IVG and Hochtief as competitors, a consensus was 
reached that the two companies should cooperate on the airport project. It appeared as if 
the privatization issue was solved.  
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However, in 2001 the consortium of the two companies made its offer, which was 
significantly lower than expected: 50 million DM, rather than the 650 million DM first 
offered by Hochtief and the 350 million DM originally promised by the IVG (RICHTER, 
2001). After additional negotiations and extended deadlines this amount was increased to 
70 million DM. This unacceptably low offer ended all hopes for privatization. Assuming 
that the investors were hesitant because of the large risk involved in building BBI—after 
all there was a possibility that lawsuits would stop the entire project—the Airport 
Holding now considered building the airport with government loans and privatizing it 
once it was fully operational. By 2003, the estimated cost for the airport alone was 1.7 
billion Euro (1.9 billion US dollars). Additional funds would be needed to connect it to 
the highway and rail system and pay for noise protection measures and environmental 
cleanup at the site. Berlin and Brandenburg were heavily indebted, so they needed the 
help of the Federal Government to build BBI.  
While these controversies were based on the assumption that BBI would be built in 
Schönefeld, a variety of different parties continued to argue in favor of other locations 
including Sperenberg, other Brandenburg sites, and even a military airfield in Poland. 
The lack of consensus was hardly resolved when, in 2004, the results of the hearings 
were made public. The 1,200-page document imposed strict limitations on night flights in 
Schönefeld and mandated that 42,000 people were entitled to receive noise-proof 
windows. Immediately citizens started to compile a list of points against BBI for a 
lawsuit at the upper court in Leipzig (Bundesverwaltungsgericht). The lawyers 
representing the citizens were positive that the ten-point list addressing issues such as 
noise, pollution and other environmental issues, and safety concerns would stop the 
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project—in their opinion every single point would be enough to convince the judge 
(SCHWENKENBECHER, 2004) . However, the supporters of BBI were equally 
convinced that they would receive permission to build the airport. In April 2005 the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht stopped the construction until a final decision could be 
reached, a step never before taken in Germany in the planning phase of a large 
infrastructure project.  
However, the airport opponents celebrated their victory prematurely: in March 2006 
the court announced its final decision that the airport could be built in Schönefeld. The 
premier of Brandenburg hailed the ruling as the “most far-reaching since reunification for 
the future of the entire region” (quoted in BENOIT, 2006:6); and the director of 
Germany’s largest science and technology park (located near Schönefeld) said the 
judgment was a “green light” to American and Japanese investors (BENOIT, 2006). The 
decision cannot be appealed, finally closing the door to further changes in plans. 
However, the court imposed a number of restrictions: There cannot be any flights 
between midnight and 5 am, and only a limited number of flights between 5 and 6 am, as 
well as 10 and 12 pm. Citizens are entitled to compensation if they live in the area where 
the average daily noise level reaches more than 62 decibels. The court also enlarged the 
area in which people have to receive sound-proof windows (“Wann starten die ersten 
Flieger?” 2006). 
Much about the future of BBI remains uncertain. The most recent cost estimates for 
BBI are 2.1 billion Euro. The city of Berlin and Brandenburg will each pay 159 million 
Euro and the Federal Government will contribute 112 million Euro. The remaining costs 
will be covered through loans. Critics, however, have pointed out that even this price tag 
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may not be correct, as the temporary expansion of Tegel and legal disputes also have to 
be factored in (BVBB, 1999). Second, businesspeople and airlines believe that the 
restrictions on night flights seriously diminish the attractiveness of the airport for cargo 
as well as LCCs (LAVALL, 2006). Third, several airlines, backed by CDU politicians, 
continue to protest against the closing of Tempelhof and Tegel.  
Nevertheless, work on the runways is scheduled to begin in 2007. The new southern 
runway will be 4000 meters long, enough to accommodate the new 555-seat Airbus 
A380, although it is unlikely that any airline will operate the “superjumbo” to the city 
(DUPONT and BURGER, 2003). The existing southern runway will be extended from 
3000 meters to 3600 meters and will then be the northern runway. The current northern 
runway will be closed (Figure 6). As part of this reorganization, the space between the 
two runways will be enlarged to permit simultaneous parallel landings. Work on the new 
terminal is planned to start in 2008, with an estimated completion in 2011 (“Wann starten 
die ersten Flieger?” 2006). 
 
Conclusions    
The March 2006 decision giving the final go-ahead for BBI is but the latest chapter 
in a long and important story. Once a premier hub, Berlin lost its status during the Cold 
War as severe limitations were imposed on airlines serving Berlin. German reunification 
and the concurrent lifting of restrictions provided the opportunity to improve its position 
once again; and at first, it looked as if Berlin could regain its status as numerous airlines 
flocked to Berlin in the early 1990s. An early analysis of the impacts of post-Communist 
restructuring on transportation in the region foresaw that "Berlin, Prague, Budapest and 
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Warsaw will all be competing for major hub status in the region in the coming decade" 
(HALL 1993, 32). In fact, air traffic has increased dramatically in Germany (BEHNEN, 
2004), but Berlin’s stature in German, European, and global airline networks has eroded.   
VON PRZYCHOWSKI (2001) declared that a decade after the German 
reunification, Berlin’s and Brandenburg’s airport politics had failed miserably. Not only 
had construction not begun on BBI, but the development of all three existing airports was 
hindered by the threats to close Tempelhof and Tegel permanently. In short, rather than 
taking the fall of the Berlin Wall and the German reunification as an opportunity to 
improve the system by getting rid of redundancies, improving service, and preparing for 
future needs, the endless debates and controversies only made the situation worse 
(BÜRGERBEWEGUNG-FLUGHAFENSYSTEM, 2006; BVBB, 1999). Even if BBI is 
built now without any further delays, it seems unlikely that it will notably increase 
Berlin’s position in the international airline networks. Major opportunities were lost for 
Berlin that are unlikely to be regained under the current trends of concentrating traffic at 
fewer major airports.  In fact, two-thirds of German air traffic is now served by just three 
airports: Frankfurt, Munich, and Dusseldorf (URBATZKA and WILKEN, 2004).  
In Berlin, meanwhile, the LCCs have largely eclipsed the flag carriers that once 
dominated air traffic there (Table 2). Air Berlin remains the city’s third most important 
airline, Britain-based EasyJet has ascended to second place, and several other LCCs rank 
in the top ten carriers in Berlin. As a result of their expansion, air traffic to and from the 
German capital grew at a phenomenal pace between 2003 and 2006; and a principal 
beneficiary of that growth has been Schönefeld, which increased its share of scheduled 
capacity in Berlin from a nadir of 8 percent in 2003 to 27 percent just three years later. 
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Much of the growth of traffic to and from Berlin continues to focus on European leisure 
destinations as well as secondary cities in northern Europe served by the LCCs (Figure 
7).  
In this most recent period LCCs have had an indirectly positive effect on the city’s 
intercontinental connections, too. Virtually chased from US domestic routes by relentless 
LCC competition, American carriers have returned to Berlin. In 2005 both Delta and 
Continental added Berlin to their rapidly expanding international networks. But like the 
LCC phenomenon itself, the return of major American carriers to Berlin (and perhaps 
later Asian carriers, too, inasmuch as LCCs are gaining market share there as well) will 
not necessarily improve Berlin’s stature in European airline networks, for American 
carriers are adding other secondary cities like Bucharest and Venice, too. Berlin remains 
and is likely to remain at best a secondary hub.  
Ultimately, two developments in the past decade and a half are to blame for this. 
First, Berlin had a big disadvantage compared to other cities: Its Cold War legacy of a 
system of three airports made it unsuitable as a hub. This was recognized as a problem 
soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but the failure of the key parties to agree on 
whether, where and how to build a new international airport meant that Berlin was 
largely powerless to affect its position in the rapidly changing airline industry. Second, 
the ongoing liberalization of air transportation has reorganized European airline networks 
in a way that did not leave much room for Berlin. Although liberalization and 
globalization have transformed the organization of the airline industry, they have tended 
to reinforce the advantages of privileged places and the disadvantages of marginal ones 
(BOWEN, 2002).  
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During the Cold War, West Berlin and East Berlin found themselves on the edges 
of the First World and Second World, respectively. Now, long after the reunification of 
Berlin, Germany and Europe, the odds against Berlin becoming one of the region’s 
foremost hubs seem very long. In that regard, Berlin is like many other places. For 
although Berlin’s history has been extraordinary, its disadvantage in the geography of the 
airline industry is ordinary. As air transportation continues to grow in importance, Berlin 
is hardly alone in looking to new infrastructure and new carriers as the means by which it 
can shed that disadvantage. Yet the globalization and liberalization of the airline industry 
mean that major hubs will probably continue to be few and far between. The expectations 
that Berlin could become a major hub between East and West were perhaps overly 
optimistic from the beginning; and local opposition to a rapid rationalization of the city’s 
air services, combined with inter-jurisdictional strife, both of which are common to 
airport expansion projects worldwide, meant that Berlin would not get the chance to try. 
Ultimately, Berlin has had neither the time nor the space to reclaim the centrality it 
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 Table 1: Measures of European Airline Network Connectivity 
 
 C/89 C/93 C/03 T/89 T/93 T/03 
Amsterdam 6 6* 8* 8 4 7 
Athens 15.5* 16* 17.5* 14 14 18 
Belgrade 19.5* 22* 20.5* 21 22 20 
Berlin 13.5* 9 15.5* 18 9 16 
Brussels 8* 10 15.5* 6 10 12 
Bratislava 29.5* 35 36 30 35 36 
Budapest 13.5* 16* 12.5* 13 16 14 
Bucharest 21 22* 23.5* 20 21 24 
Copenhagen 8* 6* 8* 7 6 9 
Dublin 26.5* 31 23.5* 26 30 23 
Frankfurt 2 1 1.5* 1 1 2 
Helsinki 19.5* 16* 19 17 17 19 
Kiev 26.5* 19.5* 12.5* 29 19 15 
Kishinev 33.5* 36 33 35 36 33 
Lisbon 23 22* 27.5* 23 23 27 
Ljubjana 28 32 29 27 32 29 
London 4* 6* 3 3 7 3 
Luxembourg 25 25 22 25 25 22 
Madrid 15.5* 18 17.5* 15 18 17 
Moscow 1 2.5* 4.5* 4 3 4 
Minsk 33.5* 33 32 32 33 32 
Oslo 24 24 25 24 24 25 
Paris 4* 6* 4.5* 2 5 5 
Prague 11* 12.5* 6 12 12 6 
Reykjavik 29.5* 29.5* 35 28 29 35 
Riga 33.5* 28 27.5* 33.5* 26.5* 28 
Rome 8* 12.5* 12.5* 9 15 10 
Sofia 17.5* 12.5* 20.5* 16 13 21 
Stockholm 17.5* 19.5* 10 19 20 11 
Tirana 31 34 34 31 34 34 
Tallinn 33.5* 29.5* 30.5* 33.5* 31 31 
Vienna 11* 6* 1.5* 10 8 1 
Vilnius 36 26.5* 26 36 28 26 
Warsaw 11* 12.5* 12.5* 11 11 13 
Zagreb 22 26.5* 30.5* 22 26.6* 30 
Zurich 4* 2.5* 8* 5 2 8 
Sources: Ivy, 1995; authors’ analysis of information in OAG, 2003. 
 
C = rank as measured by number of first-order (nonstop) schedule air passenger 
connections to other 35 sample cities. T = Rank as measured by total connectivity (taking 
account of first-, second-, and higher-order connections) to other 35 sample cities. See 
text for details. * = rank tied with that of at least one other city.  
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Table 2: Market Share of Leading Airlines in Berlin (All Three Airports Combined) 
 
Rank Airline Type 1989 Airline Type 1992 
1 Pan Am F-USA 31.9 Lufthansa F-Germany 59.7
2 British Airways F-UK 20.3 British Airways F-UK 12.0
3 Interflug F-E. Germany 10.9 Aeroflot F-Russia 3.3
4 Euroberlin France R-W. Germany 10.3 RFG Regionalflug R-Germany 2.3
5 TWA F-USA 7.6 NFD Luftverkehrs R-Germany 2.3
6 Aeroflot F-USSR 5.4 Swissair F-Switzerland 1.7
7 Air France F-France 2.8 Alitalia F-Italy 1.5
8 Malev F-Hungary 2.3 SAS F-Denmark& 1.4
9 Balkan F-Bulgaria 1.8 KLM F-Netherlands 1.3
10 Tarom F-Romania 0.8 Air France F-France 1.2
 18 Other Airlines  5.9 33 Other Airlines  13.2
 
Rank Airline Type 2003 Airline Type 2006 
1 Lufthansa  F-Germany 34.5 Lufthansa F-Germany 22.0
2 Deutsche BA R-Germany 18.7 EasyJet L-UK 13.5
3 Air Berlin L-Germany 8.1 Air Berlin L-Germany 12.0
4 British Airways F-UK 3.4 dba  L-Germany 12.0
5 Air France F-France 3.0 Germanwings L-Germany 5.2
6 Aero Lloyd R-Germany 2.9 Hapag Lloyd  L-Germany 4.9
7 Swiss F-Switzerland 2.8 British Airways F-UK 2.3
8 KLM-Royal Dutch  F-Netherlands 2.0 Swiss F-Switzerland 1.9
9 Aeroflot  F-Russia 1.9 Air France F-France 1.9
10 Hapag Lloyd  L-Germany 1.9 Ryanair L-Ireland 1.5
 41 Other Airlines  20.8 49 Other Airlines  22.9
F=  a full-service flag carrier (i.e. principal international carrier for its home country)  
R = a full-service carrier operating primarily intra-regional routes 
L = a low-cost carrier 
& = SAS is the flag carrier for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
Source: authors’ analysis of information in various issues of the Official Airline Guide. 
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Figure 6: Berlin Brandenburg International  
 
http://www.berlin-airport.de/DE/Presse/FilmUndFoto/Bildarchiv/BBI/BBIKarte.html 
[We have already received permission from BBI to use this illustration] 
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Figure 7: Direct Berlin Flights, 2006 
 
 
